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Chapter 8. Agency ‘dependency’ and welfare: beyond issues of claim 
and contribution? 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter is concerned with the concepts of agency and dependency in relation to 
contemporary welfare reform. In order to explore such issues it is divided into two 
main sections. Part one begins by critically discussing ‘Third Way’ theory and its 
implications for future welfare provision. Notions of agency and dependency are 
central to such theorising and it is argued that the ways in which these ideas are used 
and constructed is flawed. The negative implications of a welfare philosophy that over 
prioritises the ‘active welfare subject’ (Williams, 1999) whilst simultaneously 
understating the importance of continuing (and in some cases worsening) social 
divisions are also briefly discussed. Part two draws on two recently completed 
qualitative studies (see Ackers and Dwyer, 2002; Dwyer, 2001, 2000b and Dwyer, 
2002, 2000a) with different groups of welfare service users and moves on to consider 
the ways in which users themselves seek to legitimise their own (and certain other) 
claims to public welfare, whilst at the same time justifying the exclusion of other 
individuals or groups from collective support. In line with dominant Third Way 
theorising, many users discriminate between what they see as ‘welfare dependants’ 
and ‘active citizens’ when making decisions about who deserves the right to public 
welfare. It is argued that this approach is deeply flawed for three reasons. First, 
because the dichotomy between passive dependant and active citizen is false 
(Williams, 1999). Everyone of us is welfare dependant in some way at some time 
(Titmuss, 1958); but some are more visible than others (Mann, 1992, Sinfield, 1978). 
Second, it prioritises certain types of ‘responsible’ agency above others. Third, it fails 
to adequately acknowledge that a person’s ability to act in an approved manner is 
highly dependant upon the social and economic resources that they have at their 
disposal (Mann, 2001; Taylor-Gooby, 2001). Finally, in conclusion it is asserted that a 
society of ‘positive welfare’ (Giddens, 1998) will only become a reality when (if) two 
important elements are adequately acknowledged. First, the continuing significance of 
structural factors in enabling or constraining the ability of individuals to become 
active agents. Second, the importance of prioritising our collective interdependence 
when theorising welfare and enacting social policies in the future. 
 
New times, new welfare? 
 
Societies in Western Europe are undergoing a number of economic, political and 
social changes that have, potentially, profound implications for welfare states and the 
social rights of citizens (Mann, 2001; Wetherly, 2001; Ellison, 2000; Taylor-Gooby, 
2000, 1993; Williams, 1999; Giddens, 1998, 1994; Walters, 1997). In recent years 
(most notably but not exclusively in the UK), there has been much talk of a new 
‘Third Way’ politics. Advocated by Giddens (1998, 1994), and subsequently 
embraced with some enthusiasm by New Labour in Britain, (Blair, 1998, 1995) a brief 
examination of the ideas and values that underpin the ‘Third Way’ for welfare 
provides a suitable starting point when considering the emergent ‘new’ welfare 
settlement. A central theme within such theorising is the assertion that welfare states 
and individuals will best meet the challenges they face only if future welfare policies 
primarily concentrate on ensuring individual agency. 
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‘Third Way’ welfare 
 
In ‘Beyond Left and Right’, Giddens (1994) asserts that the solidarity promised in the 
post war welfare settlement (PWWS) has been eroded by two interlinked factors. 
First, the (perceived) inability of the state to effectively meet the welfare needs of its 
citizens. Second, the ‘egoistic refusal’ of the middle classes to continue playing their 
part in the welfare game. The increasing affluence of some sectors of society, 
accompanied by a reduction in the quality and quantity of state services, and, the 
simultaneous expansion of alternative private provision, has encouraged middle class 
opt out from public welfare. After all why would someone agree to contribute if they 
have little interest or need to claim? 
 
The fact that state welfare promotes and sustains a welfare dependant ‘underclass’ is, 
however, Giddens’ greatest concern. Within his work there is stress upon the 
importance of both individual and group agency as a counterbalance to the 
dependency that he associates with some state led programmes of welfare. Arguing 
that we must ditch the outdated, state led, top down approach to welfare, he believes 
that this will facilitate greater levels of individual autonomy and encourage a new 
‘positive welfare’ in which individuals recognise their personal responsibilities both 
to themselves and wider society. However, this stress on political participation, of 
citizenship in its most active sense, coupled as it is with a rejection of a fundamental 
role for the state in the provision of welfare is not without its problems.  
 
Although aware of the problem of solidarity within his theorising Giddens (1994) 
maintains that the possibility of social renewal rests upon individual agents 
recognising the importance of obligations to others that are binding and authoritative. 
A centrally important question, however, remains unanswered. In a world of disparate 
views and needs, and the inevitable disagreement that ensues, we must ask which 
voices will endure and come to dominate? His approach appears to rest on the highly 
contentious view, “that for the first time in history we can speak of the emergence of 
universal values” (Giddens 1994 :20). The twin problems of differential power and 
conflicting values remain unresolved and seriously weaken his analysis. 
 
More recently Giddens (1998) has revisited the above themes. Once again he outlines 
a new role for the ‘social investment state’ that will meet its future commitments to 
social justice and equality via the redistribution of ‘possibilities’ (primarily the 
opportunity to work and the right to education), rather than wealth. A government’s 
role in relation to welfare is to encourage an ‘entrepreneurial culture’ that rewards 
‘responsible risk takers’. Giddens is also unequivocal in making a reciprocal 
relationship between rights and responsibilities central to his approach. 
“One might suggest as a prime motto for the new politics , no rights without 
responsibilities…As an ethical principle ‘no rights without responsibilities’ 
must apply not only to welfare recipients, but to everyone….. because otherwise 
the precept can be held to apply only to the poor and needy as tends to be the 
case with the political right” (Giddens, 1998 p 65-66). 
Although the above declaration that the new rights/responsibilities rule must be 
evenly and universally applied is commendable, it fails to reflect reality. In relation to 
the social element of citizenship it is almost exclusively the rights of the poor and 
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needy that are being reduced whilst simultaneously the attendant responsibilities 
required to access those rights are being increased (Dwyer, 2002, 2000a, 1998). 
 
A further, and perhaps more worrying, aspect of Giddens' theorising is the general 
lack of vision when considering ‘welfare’ and the ‘problem’ of dependency. Titmuss 
(1958) reminded us long ago that we are all welfare dependants to a certain extent. 
Giddens’ analysis would perhaps have greater authority if he also considered the 
fiscal and occupational benefits available to the better off rather than (taking his cue 
from the New Right), concentrating solely on the more visible ‘social welfare’ 
element discussed by Titmuss (Mann, 1998). This narrow focus when discussing 
dependency has, as later discussions illustrate, profound implications for any 
subsequent theorising of agency and dependency amongst differentially sited welfare 
service users. 
 
From ‘welfare society’ to ‘active society’ 
 
Whilst Giddens optimistically endorses welfare which prioritises responsible 
individual agency as a panacea for dependency, others are more sceptical about the 
current direction of welfare reform. Walters (1997) argues that the ‘welfare society’ of 
the past that promised, theoretically at least, a common citizenship status which 
guaranteed a universal minimum of welfare rights has today been superseded by the 
‘active society’ in which increasingly individuals can only access social rights if they 
are willing to become workers in the paid labour market (PLM). Walters is not 
asserting a naive view that all was well in the past. He is aware of the ‘false 
universalism’ (Williams, 1992) of the PWWS and the fact that that a person’s 
participation and position in the highly stratified PLM has long been of central 
importance in defining the quality and extent of an individual’s access to public 
provisions. His key point is that a fundamental shift has occurred. Although imperfect, 
the state defined people in the ‘welfare society’ of the past according to various 
categories with certain ‘inactive’ groups exempted from PLM participation; either 
because they were making what were recognised as socially valid contributions 
elsewhere (e.g. women engaged in informal/familial care work) or because they had 
previously contributed (e.g. retired senior citizens). Today such assumptions are 
increasingly challenged. Whereas welfare society, 
“…imagined [as] a collective enterprise in which workers and non-workers 
make their respective contributions…many of these assumptions about the 
specifically social
Activity in the PLM is, therefore, seen both as the badge of individual integrity and 
also the only way for governments to address poverty. In contrast policies that seek 
merely to improve public welfare benefits are seen as entrenching welfare 
dependency. The state should equip those outside the PLM to embrace change, to 
actively manage the risks and challenges that confront them, by providing education 
and (re)training as required. If necessary, reluctant individuals should be forced into 
activity by the application of benefit sanctions. Only those who ‘take charge’ of their 
own lives are deemed to be responsible ‘active’ citizens (Wetherly, 2001).  
 obligations and consequent rights of the citizen no longer 
apply in the active society……The active society makes us all workers” 
(Walters, 1997 :223-4). 
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This is certainly an agenda that Giddens and New Labour have been keen to endorse  
and such ideas enjoy more extensive support. Increasingly they inform policy across 
Europe (Lǿdemel and Trickey, 2000; Van Oorschot, 2000) and in the USA (Deacon, 
2002; Prideaux, 2001) Also when tracing three contrasting attempts to rework welfare 
in the face of contemporary social change (i.e. the New Right, New Labour and new 
social and welfare movements) Williams (1999) notes, that while the three use various 
approaches and have different end results in mind, they are all looking to encourage 
and endorse the ‘active welfare subject’. Such an approach obviously has its 
attractions and it would be too simplistic to see people as passive victims of 
circumstance and/or oppressive social structures, nonetheless, as critics point out it is 
not without its pitfalls. As Wetherly (2001) notes, on one level ‘active society’/‘active 
welfare’ theories and policies are to be commended because they counter the negative 
image of welfare claimants as powerless victims. However, he also goes on to state 
that they are also inadequate because the risks that individuals confront are “structural 
in origin” (Wetherly, 2001 :164). Whilst ‘Third Way’ type welfare policies centred on 
equality of opportunity may help certain individuals to make more of themselves and 
may well be positive for some they fail to engage in any meaningful way with the 
structural causes of unemployment and poverty. The ‘active society’ approach 
‘desocialises’ the causes of poverty and individualises the problem  of unemployment. 
Those who are reliant on public welfare benefits are seen as inactive dependants who 
passively rely on public handouts as a result of either idleness or bad management of 
the risks that confront them (Walters, 1997). They are, therefore, seen as lacking any 
legitimate claim to collective support. Where once ideas of social justice and 
legitimacy were used to endorse claims to public welfare they are now often used to 
deny such claims (Bauman, 1998). 
 
Agents in action: principles, moral judgements and meeting needs 
  
The discussions in this section draw on two qualitative studies with different types of 
welfare users. In many ways the paper was motivated by nagging questions concerned 
with the theorisation of agency and dependency in current welfare debates and how 
different users, in different settings, made sense of such questions and also actually set 
about meeting their own needs. As Beresford (2001) points out, we are all welfare 
service users but in different ways. Routine visits to an NHS doctor or attending a state 
school are not the same as being a disabled person who is unable to control their 
personal care package, or living a hand to mouth existence on benefits. Certain users 
encounter, “long-term regulatory, intimate and segregating contact with welfare 
services” which regularly result in them experiencing “stigma, discrimination, poverty 
and exclusion” (Beresford, 2001 :507). Overall the respondents in the first study (rf 
Dwyer, 2002, 2000a) were people at the sharp end of British public welfare provision 
who were often heavily reliant on social welfare benefits for there day to day survival 
(see box 8.1).  
 
 5 
Ten focus groups were convened.  
       
FG 1 Benefit Claimants and a Worker  (6 men, 3 women) 
FG 2 Residents Association    (1 man, 5 women) 
FG 3 Disabled Benefit Claimants  (6 men, 2 women) 
FG 4 Senior Citizens    (4 men, 2 women) 
FG 5 Lone Parents    (1 man, 4 women) 
FG 6 Local Charity Group   (3 men, 1 woman) 
FG 7 Women Benefit Claimants  (8 women) 
FG 8 Informal Mosque Group  (5 men) 
FG 9 Asian JSA Claimants   (10 men) 
FG 10 Muslim/ Pakistani Women  (8 women) 
 
69 respondents took part in the research; of these 36 were men and 33 women, with 
ages ranging between 19 and 80 years. Forty three of the respondents could best be 
described as white, 23 as Asian and a further 3 as African Caribbean. Ten respondents 
were in work (5 full-time and five part-time) and a further 8 respondents were largely 
dependant on various retirement pensions for their upkeep. 59 of those involved were 
outside the paid labour market at the time of the study and 17 people (16 of whom 
were female) identified themselves as having caring responsibilities within a family. 
Those respondents without paid work (excepting the retired pensioners noted above) 
were reliant on a range of state benefits which included JSA, various disability 
benefits, a war pension, and income support. The focus group interviews took place 
between March and October 1997 at various locations around central Bradford, 
Yorkshire, England (for further details see appendix in Dwyer, 2000a). 
 
 Box 8.1 Outline of study with British welfare users 
 
The second study (rf Ackers and Dwyer 2002; Dwyer 2001, 2000b) focused on retired 
nationals from six EU Member States who had, at various times, migrated 
internationally within the EU. They were generally more affluent than the respondents 
in the first study and around a third had taken early retirement. Many had quite 
substantial occupational pensions and a good number who had no doubt benefited 
from various occupational and fiscal welfare arrangements were able to call upon 
considerable personal wealth and assets as and when required (box 8.2).  
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The research objectives of the study demanded a broad approach encapsulating the 
experiences of the range of international retirement migrants (post retirement 
migrants, returning workers, and returning retirees) from across the EU. Locations 
were as follows: 
 
• Greece: mainly Athens and the island of Corfu with a small number from 
Macedonia in northern Greece 
• Italy: Trieste and the surrounding rural area, also around Lake Garda 
• Portugal: Lisbon and the municipalities of Sintra and Caiscais (historic resort 
areas south of Lisbon) 
• Sweden: the whole country 
• The UK: England and Wales 
• Ireland: Dublin and County Roscommon 
 
A purposive non random, sampling technique was adopted and interviews were 
carried out during 1998/99. A total of 210 semi-structured qualitative interviews were 
held; 100 with post retirement migrants living in host EU countries and 110 with 
returnees who were resident in their country of origin (see appendix in Ackers and 
Dwyer, 2002 for further details). 
 
Box 8.2 Outline of international retirement migration in the EU study 
 
 
Although the two studies engaged with two essentially different groups of users they 
did share some common ground. First, the overwhelming majority of respondents in 
both studies were located outside the paid labour market, but usually for very different 
reasons. Second, all the respondents, were in their own ways and in a variety of 
settings, actively trying to engage with various welfare institutions to maximise the 
satisfaction of their needs at any given time. The ways in which they did this, and also 
the ways in which they looked to legitimise their own claims and the claims of others, 
to public welfare are outlined below. They are important because they help to illustrate 
many of the problems and limitations of the welfare reforms currently being mapped 
out. 
 
Principles of welfare and inclusion/exclusion 
 
As Taylor-Gooby (1998: 39) states, “social justice is concerned with who ought to get 
what.” The following discussion highlights the diverse and often contradictory ways 
(cf Dean, 2000, 1998) in which respondents seek to resolve an issue at the heart of 
any notion of social justice i.e. the principles that underpin rights to access public 
welfare provisions. In the first study (rf Dwyer 2002; 2000a), whilst the respondents 
did not categorically speak in terms of the principles that underpinned their views, 
analysis of the interviews revealed that they regularly made implicit references to 
three differing principles when justifying rights to welfare. These were categorised as 
a universal principle, a contributory principle, and a social assistance principle. Let us 
take as an example discussions on a right to healthcare. Primarily, this was justified 
according to the first two principles of universalism and contribution. The former, as 
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David’s quotation below illustrates, has at its core a universal right to treatment in 
which the needs of an individual override issues of past contribution. 
I was brought up to believe that the Health Service should be a universal 
service… available to those who require those services, not dependant on their 
income; it should be dependent upon need. David. (Benefit Claimants Group).  
When invoking a contributory principle users emphasised the previous payment of 
financial contributions and an understanding that in agreeing to fund collective health 
provision individuals then had a right to access such services e.g. 
I have worked all my life so I have paid in all my life. Linda. (Women Claimants 
Group). 
A number of respondents approved of a social assistance principle and the application 
of a means test, with tapered and or exempted contributions, in certain areas of public 
health provision. For example,  
Sorry but I have to say this before I explode. I have to pay £5.50 for my 
prescriptions and I cannot afford to go to the dentist… I don’t mind having to 
pay but there should be a grading system and I think that £5.50 for somebody 
on £20,000 a year is all right but we as people who are on a minimum wage 
should pay something like £2.50... We are not all on the same pay but they seem 
to think that everybody has to pay exactly the same, and it is wrong. Millie 
(Residents Group). 
It should come as no surprise that users made regular references which reflect these 
three differing principles as much public welfare provision has been delivered 
according to such rules.  
 
A central element of the research was also to explore the opinions of users on a fourth 
principle i.e. the principle of conditionality. This approach, which explicitly links 
access to welfare rights and entitlement to compulsory duties or approved patterns of 
behaviour, is central to the active welfare reforms being mapped out. This principle 
was perhaps the most controversial of all with approval or disapproval amongst the 
respondents varying dependent upon the context and manner in which it was applied. 
However, even in a sample dominated by people who were reliant on social welfare 
benefits, a little over 50% supported linking rights to unemployment benefits to 
compulsory behavioural and/or work or training conditions. These respondents 
believed it was vital that people made a contribution in return for benefit. If they were 
unwilling to do so benefit sanctions were deemed to be reasonable. 
There are a lot of people who don’t work and I don’t see why we who have 
worked all our lives, who have paid our dues…why these young ones should not 
put their bit into community work. Jane (Senior Citizens Group) 
There is nothing wrong with having to do something to get your money…and if 
that means you have a kick up the behind from the state, then so be it Jarvid, 
(Informal Mosque Group). 
Throughout the study this idea of individual contribution is the most prevalent 
principle used to justify the inclusion or exclusion of individuals from publicly 
provided welfare. It was particularly strong amongst those who endorsed a highly 
conditional and exclusive view of welfare citizenship. They believed that individuals 
who they deem to be unwilling, or in certain cases unable, to contribute to the 
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common good should be denied access to welfare rights; the indolent because they 
will not contribute via paid work and those beyond the nation’s boundaries because 
they have not contributed. In short, these respondents are making essentially moral 
judgements about those who are passive dependants and those who are active agents. 
 
The judgements noted above are not, of course, confined to the respondents in one 
study. Van Oorschot (2000) points out that there appears to be a sort of hierarchy of 
legitimacy in the ‘deservingness criteria’ used by the public when appraising various 
demands for collective support from different individuals and groups. In rank order 
(from most deserving of support) this runs as follows. 1). Senior citizens 2). Sick and 
disabled people 3). Families with children in need whose provider(s) are unemployed 
4). Those on social assistance. In relation to his Dutch survey Van Oorschot concludes 
that,  
When confronted with somebody asking for their support the Dutch public is 
likely to ask first: Why are they needy?, Are you one of us?, and what have you 
done or can you do for us? (2000 :43) 
In asking such questions and asserting differing principles, the public, academics and 
politicians are defining the rules of inclusion and exclusion. These principles matter 
because how and where they are applied is often the decisive factor in the type of 
welfare system that develops. They are also central to decisions about why and how 
the welfare needs of certain groups prioritised whilst simultaneously others are 
inadequately recognised or ignored. As Mullard succinctly puts it “they provide the 
limits to what’s possible” (2002 :562). 
 
Social divisions, welfare agency and visibility 
 
One of the primary concerns of those who extol the virtues of active welfare polices is 
to reduce ‘welfare dependency’ by encouraging individuals to actively help 
themselves, to become as previously noted, ‘responsible risk takers’ (Giddens, 1998). 
The emphasis on responsibility here is significant. In the new positive welfare society 
it is not enough for a person to be actively engaged with the risks and choices that 
confront them. It is also necessary that any such actions are deemed to be socially 
acceptable. A consideration of various types of agency using examples drawn from 
the two qualitative studies cited illustrates that such judgements are rarely 
straightforward. 
Well how can you be responsible on a low income you have got to dodge and be 
a deviant to survive haven't you. [Laughter etc] I have been in the past to 
survive… I mean there is deviants in all walks of life look at your millionaires, 
your tax evaders. We just try it on to know that we can put food in the kids 
mouths, put clothes on their backs. Personally, I would say with children, 
because I've had them and I've been there my money would never stretch out 
from Monday to Monday, it would never ever stretch out so I was one of those 
that was deviant to survive, I'm not saying everybody is but a lot are. I would 
get a little job here, get a little job there, or do a bit of shoplifting. It's survival 
isn't it. Molly (Lone Parents Group) 
Molly argues that some lone parents, including herself, have effectively been forced 
to behave in what many would view as an ‘irresponsible’ manner because of 
inadequate social benefits. Interestingly, she also draws a parallel with the tax evasion 
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of the extremely wealthy, a type of irresponsible behaviour that is often judged to be 
less damaging than shoplifting or benefit fraud. It could also be argued that although 
Molly is acting illegally she is essentially acting in a responsible manner; as a lone 
mother she is using the means at her disposal in order to ensure that her children are 
fed and clothed. Whether we view Molly’s behaviour as responsible or irresponsible 
depends upon the particular moral perspective we bring to bear in judging her 
behaviour, nonetheless, she is an active welfare subject confronting and managing the 
welfare needs of her family (Dwyer, 2000a). Evidence from other studies suggests 
that many of those dependant upon inadequate social benefits perceive such behaviour 
to be both rational and/or morally acceptable given their day to day struggle to make 
ends meet (see Dean 2000, 1998; Dean and Melrose, 1997). 
 
Now consider the following examples taken from qualitative research exploring the 
international migratory movements of retired European citizens within the EU (rf. 
Ackers and Dwyer, 2002; Dwyer, 2001, 2000b). Initially, many retired EU migrants 
were actively seeking to maximise their assets and the enjoyment of their later years 
by relocating in retirement.  
I’m better off here in [Corfu] with this pension I can manage twice as well as in 
France. (427 French male) 
I wouldn’t call us tax dodgers, but of course it’s a great advantage. In the case 
of his pension I think we are paying 20% less [in France] (R218) 
Putting together a package of welfare services that met what they considered to be 
their personal requirements and needs was also an important element in these 
respondents’ migratory decisions and subsequent movements; both permanent and 
temporary. Many were resourceful in getting the best welfare deal for themselves.  
One thing was my wife’s health - her arthritis improved greatly because of the 
sun and the dry climate but it started getting worse again, and we realised we 
wouldn’t be able to afford the proper treatment for it in Greece, so we had to 
re-establish ourselves with an address in England so we could then become 
recognised by the NHS. We went to live with my step-daughter in Bristol. We 
wrote to everybody saying we are back, officially we are now English residents. 
(R017 English returnee) 
A number of southern European respondents who were permanently resident in their 
country of origin at the time of interview, were also keen to ‘work the system’ in 
order to continue to access what they perceive to be the better public healthcare 
provisions of their previous host country. 
I have medical care here but officially I do not appear as a permanent resident 
in Greece. I haven't transferred my rights from Germany. My children live in 
Germany so officially I appear as living with them there. Sometimes I go and 
visit them for a couple of months…when I return from Germany I get a 
document which entitles me to medical care here. I also have the IKA insurance 
but I don't use it. I go to Germany for my check-ups. I have been doing this for 
13 years now. R416 
Respondents were not averse to bending the rules if or when altered circumstances 
demanded such action. If detrimental changes to their medical or financial 
circumstances indicated that further movement would enable them to better meet their 
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changed circumstances respondents would pursue their goal single-mindedly. In the 
words of one respondent: 
When you move abroad, you have to be curious and daring, but when it comes 
to returning to your home country you have to be very calculating and well 
organised. It’s a kind of conflict I suppose. (R220 Swedish returnee) 
Respondents generally, are creative in the way that they go about managing their 
welfare in order to maximise its potential and secure the best deal for themselves. 
Some will become officially resident in a host country if it is in their best interests 
whilst others, who to all intents and purposes are resident in host countries, decline to 
formally declare residence and retain bank accounts and/or property and assets in their 
country of origin, or elsewhere, if such arrangements best suit their needs. They are 
not adverse to manipulating tax and residency regulations for their own benefit. 
Whilst, to some extent the above migrants are operating in the ‘shadows’ of the law, 
the divide between benefit shopping/welfare tourism and ‘reflexive/active citizenship’ 
of the kind envisaged by Giddens, (1994) would seem to be finely drawn.  
 
How do the illustrative examples drawn from the two qualitative studies add to our 
understanding of active/third way type welfare policies and in particular the ways in 
which dependency and agency are theorised? The first point to note is that of a 
common dependency on public welfare in very different settings. This runs counter to 
assumptions that underpin Third Way theories which view welfare dependency in 
very narrow terms i.e. dependency on social welfare benefits. Second, many people 
are actively engaged in managing the risks that confront them. They are not passive 
spectators of formal rights and policies. Both Molly and the respondents in the 
migration study are all seeking to play the welfare game and attempting to maximise 
their well-being. Why then, if we are all dependant upon public welfare and we are all 
in a variety of ways actively trying to get the best deal for ourselves, are only certain 
types of welfare dependency and risk management considered to be irresponsible? 
The insights here of Titmuss (1958) and others (Mann, 2001, 1998, 1992; Rose, 1981; 
Sinfield, 1978) who have developed his ‘Social Division of Welfare’ thesis are 
relevant. 
 
In his essay ‘The Social Division of Welfare’ (1958), Titmuss argues that the state has 
a duty to meet the varying needs of its citizens. This it attempts to do, not with a 
single approach but through three parallel systems of welfare, ‘social,’ ‘fiscal’ and 
‘occupational,’ each of which must be considered in any discussion of the welfare 
state. ‘Social welfare’ consists of the publicly provided funds and services (social 
security benefits, local authority housing, the NHS, personal social services etc.) that 
are often the single focus of dispute when the welfare state is discussed.  In addition 
Titmuss emphasises the importance of ‘fiscal welfare’ (tax allowances and relief,) and 
also ‘occupational welfare’ the perks derived from advantageous employment in the 
labour market (pensions and fringe benefits such as cars, meals, private health 
schemes etc). The healthcare, education, social services and other wide ranging and 
significant benefits, that the welfare state provides, help to meet the varying needs of 
many different individuals and groups. By redefining welfare in a wider context 
Titmuss illustrates that differing welfare provisions, fully sanctioned by the state, are 
delivered to different groups within British society and that the middle classes gain 
substantially from the public welfare in the wider sense.  
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By focusing their attention almost exclusively on Titmuss’ ‘social’ component it has 
been easy for certain politicians and commentators to set a narrow agenda when 
debating welfare (Mann, 1998). This agenda which concentrates on both the pressing 
need to reduce the social security budget and the necessity to control and remoralise 
members of a welfare dependant and deviant ‘underclass’ is a central feature of 
active/Third Way type theories. Shifts in welfare policy noted by Taylor-Gooby 
(1993) are now essential components of the new welfare settlement. 
If the trend in relation to mass welfare provision in areas such as health, social 
care, and pensions is greater selectivity coupled with shifts in the welfare mix in 
the direction of a pluralism in service delivery, policy for the new poor has 
moved in the reverse direction. The keynote here has been a strengthening of the 
apparatus designed to control the behaviour of people of working age who are 
marginal to the labour market” (Taylor-Gooby 1993:467). 
Organisational changes in the delivery of public welfare and the emergence of the 
selective application of a principle of conditionality have undermined any previous 
notion of common citizenship that the SDW thesis implied. Against this backdrop it 
becomes easier for those who already enjoy substantial, but relatively concealed, 
benefits from social (the public healthcare and education sectors), occupational, fiscal 
welfare to denounce those with the most visible claims (i.e. those who rely on social 
welfare benefits) as passive welfare dependants. This, 
Inequality in the visibility of benefits is an important and integral part of the 
social division of welfare. The hierarchy of benefits moreover is clearly 
considerable providing very different amounts, under a wide range of 
conditions that may reinforce or strip the recipients of their status. (Sinfield, 
1978 :136-7)  
Third Way welfare policies fail to adequately theorise welfare dependency and 
individual responsibility. The dependency of the majority enjoying the benefits of 
occupational and fiscal welfare, “which they have done nothing to earn” (Goodin 
2000: 13), is basically ignored. The dependency of a minority reliant on meagre social 
welfare benefits is used to castigate claimants as irresponsible and undeserving of 
support presumably because they will not help themselves by engaging in the PLM. 
Such approaches, that legitimise certain claims to welfare by prioritising crude ideas 
of claim and contribution and moralistic ideas of individual agency and responsibility 
are flawed.  
 
Vincent (1996) reminds us that rich and poor are actively engaged in managing their 
risks but that wealthy citizens are more effective in ensuring they get what they want 
due to the advantages that they have accrued in the past. It not just the retired EU 
migrants noted above who exploit a lack of visibility and/or their assets and the ability 
to relocate to maximise the benefits that public welfare may offer. The promotion of 
themes like opportunity and choice, central to ongoing welfare reforms, reaffirm more 
generally the advantage of more affluent citizens who use their economic and social 
capital to relocate to areas with the best schools, childcare, healthcare facilities. It is 
unlikely that those involved will be denounced as irresponsible, despite the fact that 
their active agency, their exercising of choice, compounds the marginalisation of 
“worst off citizens [are] left in districts with the worst public services, as well as 
highest rates of crime, drug use, violence and other social problems” (Jordan 2001: 
529). Against this backdrop of increased marginalisation and the ‘enforcement ethos’ 
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of various ‘new deals’ those at the sharp end of public welfare are active themselves 
in using a variety of methods, including claiming social security whist working, to 
ensure that their needs are met (Jordan, 2001). The key question is who are the 
responsible, reflexive citizens, who are the calculating, irresponsible, self interested 
welfare dependants? 
 
Across Europe, less universal and more conditional and selective welfare 
arrangements are being put in place (Van Oorschot, 2000) and it is increasingly 
difficult for individuals and groups to have their claims to welfare recognised as 
deserving of public support. Contemporary academics, politicians and users alike all 
make judgements about who has, and has not, got a legitimate claim to public welfare 
and why one claim is more deserving than another. As active/Third Way welfare 
starts to dominate, principles of need and entitlement become marginal and notions of 
desert and individual responsibility start to dictate our deliberations. Such ideas are 
poorly suited to the development of systems of public welfare that will best meet the 
needs of people marginalised and disadvantaged groups. In reality who gets what 
from the welfare state, and when and how they get it, has little to do with personal 
responsibility and desert. If necessary people will mobilise various ‘deservingness 
criteria’ (Van Oorschot, 2001) to make or validate a claim for public welfare 
services/benefits even if they have previously spent a lot of time and energy trying to 
minimise their contributions to collective welfare in the past (White, 2000). It is often 
the most skilful operators, rather than the most deserving claimants, who operate most 
successfully within the maze of rights, rules and administrative discretion (Adler, 
1997) that make up contemporary welfare states. 
 
A more sophisticated understanding of agency is required than the one offered by 
Giddens and Third Way supporters. As people are confronted with the realities of 
social change and the risks that it entails they are willing to take chances. They will 
consider certain actions on the boundaries of formal legality as legitimate because 
they offer the best way for them to meet their needs within a real situation. As Voruba 
notes,  
With the widening gap between institutionalised normality and real living 
conditions some kinds of life chances emerge that might be illegal but are seen 
as legitimate by the people in question…thus people’s strategies for coming to 
terms with reality collide with official offers of inclusion (2000 :608-11). 
Empirical evidence suggests that the majority of those of working age who are reliant 
on social benefits are as keen as the rest of the population to engage with the PLM and 
thus meet their wider responsibilities (Dean, 2000, 1998; Dwyer, 2000a; Bryson 
1997). Orton, similarly, argues in chapter XX that a lack of required council tax 
payments was indicative of people trying to cope with poverty rather than a deficit of 
citizen responsibility. In their own ways and from different positions within our 
highly stratified and unequal societies everybody (with varying degrees of success), is 
trying to secure the best welfare deal for themselves. Recent social, political and 
economic changes mean, that most citizens are effectively pursuing either ‘proactive’ 
or ‘defensive’ strategies in relation to their welfare needs at any one time. These are 
two different types of activity. 
The distinction lies between those whose power location creates an ‘ability’ to 
intervene in ways that can transform their position in a particular area of the 
public sphere, and those lacking access to relevant power networks who find 
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themselves engaged in efforts…simply to preserve existing interests and 
entitlements (Ellison, 2000 :para 1.4). 
As Taylor-Gooby (2001, 2000) notes ‘risk’ is differentially experienced by different 
social groups in contemporary society. Active/Third Way welfare works to the 
advantage of more privileged citizens and to the detriment of vulnerable groups. 
Social/economic divisions still matter in relation to welfare risks and an individual’s 
ability to manage them.  
 
 
Conclusions: positive ways forward  
 
It is not the intention of this paper to criticise or condemn the various tactics used by 
different groups of welfare service users to ensure that their needs are met. We are all 
dependant on public welfare systems at various times throughout our lives. It is 
important that we as academics assert more sophisticated understandings of agency 
and welfare dependency than those currently the vogue. As theorists concerned with 
the SDW point out narrow conceptions of social rights/responsibilities and 
dependency are wrong. Furthermore, the simplistic dichotomy between two ideal 
types; the independent, responsible active, (full-time) paid worker and the 
irresponsible, passive, welfare dependent who do not to engage with the PLM, at the 
heart of many current welfare reforms, fails to recognise more complex social reality 
in two ways. First, the extent to which a functioning market economy and formal 
public welfare systems depend upon gendered, informal welfare for their continued 
successful operation Second, the extent to which many so called dependants assume 
such burdens of informal care yet remain unrecognised and undervalued (Lister, 1997, 
1990; Rose, 1981). Active/Third Way theories which dominate contemporary welfare 
reforms are built around the principle of highly conditional social welfare rights and 
limited notions of socially valuable contribution and agency. They lead us towards 
exclusive and coercive welfare systems in the future. It is important to recognise the 
limited potential of such approaches for meeting the needs of marginalised social 
groups (cf. Taylor-Gooby, 2000; Dean, 2000). Welfare to work policies, so often 
identified as being of central importance, appear better at meeting the requirements of 
industry and capital rather than poor citizens (Peck, 2001; Prideaux, 2001).  
 
Given the serious shortcomings of active/Third Way welfare outlined in this paper 
how then do we move forward positively in relation to welfare reform? Clearly, it 
would be as wrong to view the PWWS as a golden age to be recaptured. Social 
change and the well documented shortcomings of past policies make such an aim 
undesirable and inappropriate. Today, by many, welfare dependency is narrowly 
defined as a stigmatising signal of individual failure (Batsleer and Humphries, 2000). 
This view needs to be countered. Simplistic debates that contrast dependence and 
independence are flawed; we are all socially interdependent. Our very sense of self, 
who we are, is constructed overtime through our links and relationships with other 
human beings. We all exercise choice and agency in relation to welfare against the 
backdrop of the complex and changing welfare institutions. These may provide both 
opportunities or constraints to particular groups at different times (Twine, 1994). 
 
It has been suggested that in the UK, New Labour’s Third Way has seen the 
introduction of a range of polices some of which “attempt to level the playing field 
and some of which are designed to activate the player” (Deacon, 2002 : 117). 
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Supporters of Third Way welfare such as Deacon, however, also recognise that in 
spite of recent significant commitments to fund healthcare and education through 
increased national insurance contributions (rf. Taylor-Gooby et al, 2002 for details), 
not enough emphasis has been placed on tackling existing, unacceptable material 
inequalities. Greater levels of economic redistribution in favour of poor citizens must 
be a central feature of future welfare policy, because as Twine notes, “redistributing 
resources also redistributes freedom and choice” (1994 :12). The promotion of 
policies that prioritise the notion of interdependence also need to be to the fore, not 
least as a counter to the fallacy of the celebrated, independent self reliant citizen. As 
Williams states, 
We need to recognise that we are all necessarily dependant on others, but at the 
same time challenge the institutions, structures and social relations which 
render some groups unnecessarily dependant (1999:667). 
This may be hard for some people to accept because it means that we are faced with 
the reality that our progress, or elevated social status, is often achieved with the help 
of, or at the expense of others. It may well be time to prioritise values such as need 
and interdependence when theorising welfare. Positive welfare will only become a 
future reality if academics, politicians and users adequately acknowledge that the best 
starting point for meeting the diversity of needs that exist in modern societies is a 
recognition of ‘our common humanity’ (Harris, 2002).  
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